Workers Compensation Case Studies
Here is a sample case.
I.
Assault - Victim of racially motivated name-calling retaliates
by
assaulting coworker who said he was only joking.
Redman Industries Inc. v. Lang, 943 P2d 208 (Oregon) 1997
Lang worked for a manufacturing plant operated by Redman
Industries Inc., installing windows on manufactured homes. He was
white and worked closely with Frazier, an African-American man.
One
day, Frazier got mad when Lang jokingly called him a derogatory
racial name. The next day, Frazier warned Lang not to repeat such
comments, but Lang persisted. Although Frazier knew Lang was
trying to joke with him, he became very upset. A few minutes
later, another coworker called Frazier a Spanish name that Frazier
believed to be a racial slur. Frazier hit the coworker. Seeing
Lang talking to a supervisor, Frazier thought he would lose his
job for hitting the coworker. Thinking he "had nothing to
lose," Frazier punched Lang several times.
Lang
filed for benefits, but the employer denied the claim. After a
hearing, the administrative law judge awarded benefits, ruling
Lang's injuries arose out of and in the course of his employment.
The Workers' Compensation
Appeals Board reversed, ruling that although Lang was hurt in the
course of employment, his injuries did not arise out of
employment. The court said that Lang's injuries weren't the result
of a risk connected with his employment. Even though day-to-day
friction may provide the necessary connection between employment
and a coworker's assault, their dispute was not about work.
Decision: reversed, benefits granted.
Case
Notes:
To be compensable, an assault victim's injuries didn't have to be
the result of a dispute about work: "The most direct cause of
an assault by a coworker may be criticism of another employee's
work, lack of hygiene or fashion sense. However, in any such case,
the criticism may be but the last of many straws precipitating the
assault... The risk of assault by a coworker in the workplace is a
risk to which the work environment exposes an employee."
II. Carpal Tunnel Syndrome
Worker claims disability after one day on the job
Doctors attribute carpet tunnel injury to single day of work
North River Insurance Co. v. Manpower Temporary Services, 568 N.
W.2d 15 (Wisconsin) 1997
Buczko worked for Manpower Temporary Services. In November 1992,
the temporary agency sent him to work at Freedom Plastics Inc.,
where he was assigned to operate a deburring machine. He allegedly
experienced pain in his right wrist, but didn't mention it or lose
any time from work.
On
Dec. 31, Buczko stopped working for Manpower to become a Freedom
employee. His first day of work was Jan. 4, 1993. At the end of
that workday, he went to the human resources department to report
numbness in his hand and fingers. The company assigned him to do
non-repetitive work the next day, but he continued to complain of
pain. The next day, Buczko went to work, but couldn't perform his
duties. The company doctor diagnosed carpal tunnel syndrome.
Another
doctor confirmed Buczko had carpal tunnel syndrome and performed
surgery on Jan. 21. The doctor reported Buczko's work on Jan. 4
was a substantial factor contributing to his disability. The
doctor later changed his opinion somewhat - he said Buczko's work
exposure from Nov.
13 (when he worked for Manpower) to Jan. 4 (when he worked for
Freedom) was the major contributing cause of his disability. He
said the additional day of working on the machine wasn't a large
enough factor in the onset or progression of Buczko's carpal
tunnel syndrome.
At
Freedom's request, a professor of occupational medicine viewed a
videotape of the deburring activity. The professor concluded
Buczko's work during a single day was unlikely to have aggravated
or caused his condition.
After a hearing, the administrative law judge concluded Buczko was
entitled to compensation. Because Buczko didn't have any
disability (inability to work) before Jan. 4, that was the date of
injury and Freedom was solely liable to pay benefits. On appeal,
the Labor and Industry Review Commission affirmed.
On appeal, the court reversed, ruling Manpower was liable because
Buczko's work in November and December while employed by Manpower,
not the
single day as a Freedom employee, was the materially contributing
cause of his condition.
Buczko
appealed.
DECISION:
Reversed.
Even though Buczko worked there only one day, Freedom was
responsible for paying benefits.
Freedom
was the employer "at the time of injury." As defined by
state law, the time of injury meant the date on which the claimant
was disabled. Even if his work while employed by the temporary
agency contributed to his condition,
Buczko
didn't become disabled until Jan. 4, when he was a Freedom
employee. Before that, he neither complained about his condition
nor lost any work time. Although the medical evidence was in
conflict, enough evidence showed
Buczko's
disability occurred during his employment with Freedom.
CASE
NOTES: "At first blush, it may appear unfair to obligate
Freedom for Buczko's workers' compensation benefits in light of
Buczko's single day of work as a Freedom employee." But, the
court observed, "the rule [that the employer at the time of
disability must pay benefits] will work no injustice to any
individual carrier or employer because the law of averages will
equalize burdens imposed by this act among the employers and
compensation insurers of this state."
III. Suspension of Benefits Employee declines light-duty job
offer
Worker
wants to keep lower-paying job
Royal
v. Workers' Compensation Appeal Board (Mayfield Foundry Inc.),
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court No. 3460 C.D. 1997 (1999)
Royal was a foundry supervisor at Mayfield Foundry Inc. He hurt
his shoulder and finger in 1993. During his treatment and
recuperation through the end of the year, the foundry paid him
temporary total disability benefits.
Royal's
doctor released him to light-duty work in March 1994, but the
foundry didn't have a light-duty job available. Royal found and
accepted a lower-paying light-duty job at another employer. The
foundry paid him partial disability benefits.
In
April 1995, the foundry offered Royal his pre-injury job, modified
to meet his medical restrictions, with his pre-injury wages,
benefits, and work schedule. Royal turned down the offer. He said
he was worried about job security - he thought the foundry might
go out of business within two years.
The employer asked for suspension of Royal's benefits, alleging he
did not act in good faith when he declined the foundry's offer of
the light-duty job at his pre-injury wage. After a hearing, the
workers' comp judge agreed, suspending Royal's benefits. On
appeal, the Workers' Compensation Appeal Board affirmed. Royal
appealed.
DECISION:
Affirmed, benefits suspended.
Royal could no longer receive benefits after rejecting the
foundry's job offer.
The foundry offered Royal a job that was both at his pre-injury
wage and within his medical restrictions. Royal was obligated to
accept the offer or suffer the consequences. "Disability is
synonymous with earning power; thus, where the employer shows the
claimant can earn his pre-injury wages, the claimant is no longer
disabled in the legal sense, and benefits will be
suspended. " .
Royal didn't act in good faith when he rejected the job because of
his subjective concerns about job security. Lack of good faith
didn't mean "overt malfeasance" on the employee's part,
but rather his rejection of the job without a good reason. His
personal preference for the lower-paying job was not enough - and
he had no proof to back up his job-security worries.
CASE
NOTES:
"The claimant has the responsibility to seek work that
provides earnings that are substantially similar to his time of
injury wages."
Note: California requires that it be not less than 85% of what the
employee's earnings were at the time of the injury.
IV. Course of Employment
Recreational
Activities
Accountant
has fatal heart attack during bowling match
Dorosz was a senior accountant at Green & Seifter, a private
accounting firm. Every Monday night, he bowled on a team sponsored
by a friend, who was a long-standing client. According to Dorosz's
family, he did so for business reasons - Dorosz and the client
discussed the client's business concerns before and after bowling.
One
night, Dorosz and the client discussed business and bowled three
games. Minutes later, Dorosz collapsed and died of a heart attack.
Dorosz's family filed for benefits. After a hearing, a workers'
comp law judge awarded benefits. On appeal, however, the Workers'
Compensation Board reversed, ruling Dorosz's voluntary
participation in an off-duty athletic activity was not part of his
work related duties.
New York law barred benefits when an employee was hurt while
voluntarily participating in off-duty athletic activities that
weren't part of the employee's work-related duties. There was an
exception when the employer required the employee to participate,
paid the employee to participate, or otherwise sponsored the
event.
After
the appeals court affirmed the denial of benefits, the family
appealed to New York's highest court. The family contended that
Dorosz's participation on the bowling team substantially benefited
the employer, so it was part of his work-related duties.
DECISION:
Affirmed, benefits denied.
Dorosz's family was not entitled to benefits.
Even
if the employer benefited from Dorosz's participation on the
bowling team, the law barred benefits for his death. As a
threshold matter, the law required that the activity be part of
the employee's work-related duties. It's obvious that the
accountant was not engaged in work -related duties while bowling.
None of the law's exceptions applied. The employer didn't require
or pay Dorosz to bowl. Nor did the employer "otherwise
sponsor the activity." The employer may have known about the
weekly game, but didn't overtly encourage his participation.
Case
Notes: New York's highest court affirmed the decision of the
appeals court to deny benefits. The court reviewed the law's
legislative history, which showed "the Legislature narrowed
the standards for what constitutes a compensable work-related
sports injury, so that an award would not be based upon
insufficient employer involvement."
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